Pakistan ranks bottom third quantile of the World Bank governance indicator, and there has been little or no improvement in government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption for decades. The civil bureaucracy is one of Pakistan’s top management and administrative unit. Still, reports have shown that the civil bureaucracy’s overall performance is worsening day by day.
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) has published a comprehensive book on civil services reforms entitled “Public Sector Efficiency, Perspective on Civil Services Reforms.” According to the book, the club-like mentality, high social status, perks, political interventions, lack of accountability, lack of professionalism, and dominance of the generalist cadre in the services are some key issues hindering the provision of public service delivery and undermining the efficiency.
The objective of civil services was to control administrative work and boost economic growth through rapid reforms and their timely implications. But unfortunately, in the current monolithic environment of civil services, one cannot even think about civil services reforms due to the elite_ upper urban class, landlords, and judiciary because they are key stakeholders and beneficiaries. So, how can they propose any reform going against their interests?
Lack of accountability is one way of the poor performance because they know no one can question their ‘God Gifted’ right to rule. The accountability system is so pathetic that from 1984 to 2000, only 104 members were charged with misconduct. In the end, less than 20% were found with any wrongdoing, and it took many years to decide. Political intervention is the other way which is a great hindrance in the performance of bureaucracy because if any servant does not have political stretch, then he cannot hold a key position in civil services even after his outperformance.
The current system of pay and perks in superior services is insane, inconsistent, and inefficient.
The salary is (cash in hand) meager, and perks (non-cash facilities) are very high. On the one hand, the perks cannot meet the basic cash needs from money, e.g., children’s schooling and family support; on the other hand, it reminds us of the colonial mindset. A servant enjoying high facilities at the government’s expense will develop facilities that way, and a club-like mentality will not be curtailed. Pay scales in Pakistan are so inconsistent and detritus that many scales overlap. If a lower and upper scale officer earns equal pay, this will demotivate the upper scale holding worker from work, and lower scale workers will also not work because he already is getting more wages.
When the pays are inconsistent, it creates a severe concern for housing and other facilities. Housing facilities are also incompatible. For example, a 22-grade officer will get Rs. 16,980, if he is not residing in a government house. On the other hand, imagine a civil servant living in a 104 Kanal Banglow! Would it not be enough to create demotivation and inefficiency?
In almost all departments and civil bureaucracy, promotions occur on a seniority basis (in que), and no performance-based mechanism exists. Asim Khawaja’s study on the Punjab Excise and Taxation department, published in American Economic Review, had found a 44% increase in tax revenue in Punjab when they linked promotion and transfer with their performance (performance-based promotion). All over the world, the Tenure Track Scale is widely accepted, but the hell is with Pakistan.
Lastly, training is one thing that plays key role in boosting efficiency and service delivery. Unfortunately, in our bureaucracy, the training is compromised. Up-to-date training is the only tool to help civil servants stand later in life.
Many civil service reforms have been proposed, accepted, and implemented, but none have played a significant role. The problem with reforms is that they reform civil servants in place of civil services, which is the root cause of the problem. As our services deteriorated, a ‘big bang’ approach is required to reform the ailing sector. Again, we can learn from Argentina, which shed more than 320,000 employees from the government due to the worsening performance and economic downturn between 1989 and 1994. Here are some reforms based on the deep study which might be beneficial.
First, selection criteria must be revised, and technocrats should be included. Secondly, selection should not be on political grounds and should increase the attrition rate from 3 percent; otherwise, it will take 40 years to achieve a particular benchmark. Thirdly, the basic pay scale should be revised, and perks should be minimized or removed; it may help bury the colonial mindset 6 feet under the ground.
Finally, an increase in current salary and its linkages with performance will help boost performance and efficiency in service delivery and will not put pressure on pensions in the government pocket. There must be specific reforms in pensions because Punjab pays 50 % of its annual revenue to pensioners.
