Interpretive tools are meant to help us find what a law means. In practice, they are mostly used to defend a meaning already chosen. This article argues that the problem begins in drafting, and that predictable interpretation in Pakistan will remain out of reach until drafting and adjudication are treated as one continuous discipline.
1. A sign at the park gate
Imagine a sign at the entrance of a public park: “No vehicle allowed inside the park.” Nobody doubts that a car must be turned away, or a jeep, a bus, a truck or a motorcycle. What of a wheelchair, battery-operated or pushed by hand? A skateboard? A naval vessel, or an airplane, if one could somehow reach the gate? Each question is easy to ask and, once asked, hard to answer without making a choice.
Pakistan’s statute books are full of such signs. Most of the time they are read without difficulty. When they are not, a familiar sequence follows: the citizen reads the sign one way, the executive another, the lawyer in whichever way suits the client, and finally the judge in a way that becomes binding. Each then claims to have found what Parliament meant. Meanwhile, the books that should guide these readers help little. Pakistan has hundreds of titles on legislative drafting and statutory interpretation, yet many repeat the same established tools, and some cite judgments that do not support the principle stated.
For example, acknowledging the services for legal fraternity of Late Mr. S M Zafar, and his book “Understanding Statutes” 4th Edition, it make numerous reference to Indian Judgments and it was worth pointing out that the same content and case laws, in same order and words and headings was available in N S Bindra’s, Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition, without acknowledging the latter.
This article makes four claims. First, grey areas in language are inevitable, so the real question is who fills them and how openly. Second, the “legislative intent” invoked to justify the filling is, in grey-area cases, usually the interpreter’s own conclusion attributed to a body that cannot answer back. Third, the interpretive tools meant to discipline that process are mostly used to justify results rather than to reach them. Fourth, the discipline that could narrow the grey areas, legislative drafting, is in Pakistan disconnected from the discipline that resolves them, judicial interpretation. The article closes with modest proposals for joining the two.
2. The grey area is not an accident
The park example is borrowed from the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. Hart used it to show that every general word has a core of settled meaning and a penumbra of doubt. Fuller answered that meaning cannot be separated from purpose: whether a war memorial built from a decommissioned military truck offends the sign depends on what the rule is for.[1]
The lesson is that language has an inherent limit. A word can never encompass everything it is meant to cover, and it may cover things it was never meant to. “Vehicle” seems clear because we picture objects with tyres and an engine: a car, motorcycle, jeep, bus or truck. By extension, the word reaches hybrid and electric bikes, which run on a battery. A sign at the park gate plainly excludes all of these. But a wheelchair has wheels, may have a battery, and is used for locomotion. With each further example, we move from the clear area into a grey one, while some things may still fall clearly outside the word altogether. Interpretation begins at that boundary. Where a word falls within the grey area, the subjects of the law are left to interpret it according to their own understanding.
A drafter cannot abolish the grey area. A drafter can, however, narrow it (“no motor vehicles”), mark exceptions (“except wheelchairs”), or state the purpose that should guide the reader (“to keep the park safe for pedestrians”). Whether Pakistani drafting does any of this consistently is taken up in Parts 9 and 10.
3. Everyone is an interpreter
Statutory interpretation is not the exclusive enterprise of the courts. It is performed by the ordinary subject of the law, who must decide whether a provision applies to him, and by the executive officer who must enforce it. It is performed by the lawyer who reads it in the way that best supports the client’s case, and by the judge who considers that law and policy should move in a particular direction. It is performed, first of all, by the policy maker who chose the words to implement a policy and expects every other actor to understand and follow what he or she requires.
If a text is clear and precise, why should so many readers reach so many conclusions? Language is part of the answer, as Part 2 showed. The other part is that each reader has an interest. The court’s reasoning is only the visible tip of a much larger activity, and because it carries final authority, its stated justifications deserve the closest scrutiny.
4. Do drafting and interpretation belong together?
The relationship between legislative drafting and statutory interpretation is itself debatable. For some, statutory interpretation is a method used by judges to ascertain what a statute means, to whom it applies and how it interacts with other statutes, and its general rule is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Some scholars therefore see the principles of interpretation as having no place in the drafting process: the drafter writes, the judge reads, and neither need look at the other. A third perspective goes further and holds that legislative intent is irrelevant, because the interpreter’s job is to discern what a statute means, not what the legislature intended it to mean.
Each of these views, properly followed, makes drafting more important rather than less. If intent is the target, the drafter is best placed to state it, and should do so in the text. If intent is irrelevant and only meaning counts, the text is all there is, and its quality is decisive. And if judges alone interpret, they still read what the drafter wrote, using rules the drafter can know in advance. On any view, the drafter writes for a reader whose habits are known.
Perhaps the ultimate measure of a drafter’s success is that he captures the legislature’s intent and turns it into a statute with meaning. Using interpretive principles while drafting lets a legislative lawyer add clarity in a predictable way. That raises a question about who really gives a statute its meaning: the drafter who writes it, or the court that reads it in order to further the legislature’s intent? When drafters and courts use the same tools, statutes have the potential to be interpreted consistently, and that shared meaning is the real goal. As the following parts show, that potential is in practice not realised.
5. The fiction of legislative intent
Asked what they are doing, interpreters usually answer that they are discovering legislative intent. In grey-area cases, that answer has two difficulties.
First, if Parliament had intended a particular meaning for the disputed case, it should have said so explicitly, and there would be nothing to impute. Second, the interpreter’s conclusion is necessarily his or her own, and it is then attributed to the legislature. The actor implies that his or her reading was Parliament’s intent all along. This is a convenient justification, because Parliament cannot speak or respond unless it expressly amends the law to correct the reading imputed to it.
Such amendments are rare, for practical and political reasons. A legislature may not have the time to insert them. There is also a structural obstacle: once a court’s interpretation has acquired binding authority, a legislature that tries to restore the original meaning may find itself accused of overriding the judiciary, which raises constitutional questions of its own. For example, in the judgment of Honorable Lahore High Court, by Justice Shahid Kareem, he read in that the minimum age for a boy to marry in Pakistan is 18 years. This was eventually done through Child Marriage Restrain Act 2026 that repealed Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929. Another example was that in the case of Amin Masih v Federation of Pakistan[2], the then Chief Justice of Honorable Lahore High Court, Justice Mansoor Ali Shah held that repealed section 7 of the Christian Divorce Act of 1869 was to be restored and section 7 was to be read in, and the UK Matrimonial Causes Act 1873 was held to be applicable to Christian divorces in Pakistan.
A fair objection should be conceded. Legislators do have general purposes, and it would be too strong to say that no intent exists. The claim here is narrower: legislators rarely have a specific intent about the particular grey-area case before the court. The more candid description of what interpreters do in those cases is therefore not “discovering” intent but choosing a meaning and defending the choice.
6. Hansard: intent in a minister’s voice
The one place where courts openly look for evidence of intent is the parliamentary record. English courts opened that door in Pepper v Hart[3], a fiscal case, by allowing reference to Hansard in limited circumstances, and the Supreme Court of Pakistan has on occasion referred to Hansard as well. In Manzoor Ahmad v M Umar Farooq[4] , SKMT v POP[5], CIR (Zone II) v Muhammad Osman Gul[6]. The argument for the practice is that Hansard may exceptionally be used as an external aid to interpretation, especially for fiscal statutes, where a minister’s explanation can be the clearest statement of how a provision was meant to work.
The difficulty is that Hansard records the views of a member or a minister, not of Parliament as a whole. Can the views of one minister or member be equated with the intention of the legislature? The usual counter is that once the bill is passed, the legislature has accepted the minister’s reasoning, and that reasoning may be imputed to it as its intention.
That reply deserves scrutiny. A vote on a bill is a vote on its text. Members may support the same text for different, even conflicting, reasons, and some vote without having heard the debate. To say the House adopted the minister’s reasoning is a further imputation of the very kind criticised in Part 5, not an escape from it. Later English decisions have narrowed Pepper v Hart as well. The Hansard debate therefore does not solve the problem of intent. It shows the problem in its sharpest form, and it teaches drafting a plain lesson: what matters must be in the text, because the text is the only thing the legislature actually enacted.
7. Tools that justify rather than discover
The interpreter’s arsenal is large: text, structure, purpose, legislative intent, legislative history, and a body of theories and doctrines on whether, when and how each should be consulted. Across hundreds of judgments and dozens of books, and in the way academics and judges alike have used these devices, one pattern appears. The tools are used to justify an interpretation, not to reach it.
The pattern is not peculiar to Pakistan. Karl Llewellyn observed long ago that for almost every canon of construction there is an equal and opposite canon[7]. When both a canon and its opposite are available, the choice between them is made by something outside the canons, namely the result the interpreter prefers.
The one real external constraint on the substance of a statute is the overall constitutional structure, with its checks and balances. The procedural side of the rule of law also influences how laws are drafted. But these operate at the edges. Inside the grey area, the tool follows the outcome.
8. Interpretation or construction?
A distinction is worth drawing here, because it exposes what interpreters are really doing. Interpretation, in the strict sense, is the discovery of the meaning of a law in accordance with the legislature’s intent. On this view the intent was always there and is only found. Construction, by contrast, is the building of meaning where the text does not supply it, so that the statute can be applied in a way that reaches what the legislature would have wanted. [8]
Construction is, arguably, the antithesis of interpretation. It concedes that the legislature failed to cover an area, which is entirely possible despite the presumption that Parliament knows the law. It also concedes that judges, in filling the lacuna, make law. Its logic rests on a counterfactual: had the legislature known of the gap, it would have filled it in the same way the court has. That counterfactual is itself an imputation, and it brings us back to the difficulty of Part 5.
The honest label for much of what Pakistani courts do in grey areas is therefore construction. Calling it interpretation conceals the choice being made.
9. Who drafts: a chair, a counsel and a lawyer in private practice
If grey areas cannot be eliminated, the skill of the drafter determines how large they are and how clearly they are marked. That skill is specialised, and a simple example shows why.
Imagine that an office chair has just been polished and its paint is still wet. The drafter is asked to write a sign. He begins: “No one shall sit or place anything on this chair.” For how long? He revises: “…until the paint dries.” Who will decide that the paint has dried? “…as determined by the carpenter.” What if the carpenter dies, or is declared bankrupt, before the paint dries? “In case the carpenter is declared dead or bankrupt, the determination shall be made by a carpenter having expertise and appointed by the owner of the chair.” He then places the page on the chair and realises that if nothing may be placed on the chair, the page itself may not be placed there either. He rewrites: “No one shall sit or place anything on this chair, except this page, until the paint dries as determined by the carpenter…” Even after this, a large number of questions and confusions remain in the drafter’s mind. What counts as “dry”, for instance?
Each fix answers one question and raises the next. This is the drafter’s craft: anticipating the grey area before the reader finds it. A statute raises such questions on a far larger scale than a sign on a chair.
The British approach treats legislative drafting as an entirely skilled and specialised field, and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel is highly specialised even when compared with its American counterpart. In the United States, bills are drafted not only by the Offices of Legislative Counsel of the House and the Senate but also by the legal staff of congressional committees and of individual government departments. In both the United States and Pakistan, most legislation is drafted by people who, however good they may be in their substantive specialties, have only a fleeting acquaintance with the expertise that good drafting requires. British drafting is far better in quality because of that specialisation.
Britain gave up, in the nineteenth century, a practice that still survives in Pakistan: the drafting of government bills by lawyers in private practice, with the government’s law and parliamentary affairs department doing no more than vetting them. Those lawyers did legislative drafting for the government as they would any other work for any other client. As one who comes from that group, I must admit its shortcomings.
None of this argues that the American drafting style, as it appears in the drafting codes prepared there, should be applied mutatis mutandis in Pakistan, or that the British style should apply automatically. It does suggest that better styles and approaches are available and may be adopted.
10. Conventions without principle
Even the basic vocabulary of drafting is left to taste. A question I always put to newcomers to legislative drafting is: what is the difference between an article and a section? The most common answer is that articles are the provisions of a constitution or of substantive law, while sections belong to procedural law. The examples say otherwise. The Constitution and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 are organised in articles, and the periods of limitation in the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908 are numbered as articles, whereas the Pakistan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure, substantive and procedural laws alike, are organised in sections. The honest answer is that there is no distinction. It is at the drafter’s discretion, and there is no binding reason to prefer one over the other.
The law itself says how its provisions are to be referred to. A provision that begins “notwithstanding anything contained in section 44 of the Act” shows that the Act’s provisions are called sections. Provisions within them are called subsections or clauses, and such references are usually made within the same legislative document, as in “provided that the application of sub-section (2) shall be suspended until…”. A convention like this can safely be left to taste. But a drafting culture that treats even its basic conventions as matters of taste has no means of agreeing on the larger ones.
The larger ones are no better settled. Drafting patterns in Pakistan have changed over time, and styles have changed not only with time but from one legislature to another. The federal style differs from Punjab’s, and the other provinces differ again. Much of the interpretive framework is supplied by the General Clauses Acts. It is worth noting for pedagogic purposes that the Punjab General Clauses Act 1956 applies to provincial laws, whereas the General Clauses Act 1897 applies to federal laws. It has been observed that these Acts are sometimes applied without any inquiry into which one governs.
Other efforts have fared no better. Some NGOs have prepared model drafting standards, but none has been consistently followed, and international standards are often not complied with. Drafters must also accommodate stakeholders who wish to turn their policies into law, and this too often happens at the cost of procedural and substantive conceptions of the rule of law and of sound drafting principles.
Most telling is the relationship between drafting manuals and the courts. Manuals prepared by NGOs or government bodies have never visibly influenced judicial reasoning on interpretation, and even where they may have, that influence has never been explicitly acknowledged or endorsed. This is partly because they address a different subject: formatting, grammar, word choice and style. Courts discuss meaning, intent and purpose. The two conversations run in parallel and never meet. A drafter who follows a manual to the letter has no assurance that a court will read the resulting text any differently.
11. Why the rule of law cannot be the anchor
The usual response to arbitrary interpretation is to appeal to the rule of law. I am among those who say that the rule of law must be adhered to, but for two reasons my confidence in it as an anchor has diminished over time.
First, the rule of law has no single, definitive meaning, and the term is so commonly used that it is now abused and has gone beyond its context and scope. Its substantive content varies from one legal system to another. Where, as under Article 227 of the Constitution, laws must conform to the Injunctions of Islam, the content of the rule of law also depends on which understanding of those Injunctions prevails. The procedural conception, on the other hand, is indifferent to substance, and if it is accepted as the correct conception, an unjust or even evil legal system could still comply with it perfectly.
Second, there is the practical observation that the rule of law is frequently invoked by those in power to remain in power. Those who oppose the status quo are labelled violators of the rule of law, whatever one’s own political affiliation. Law enforcement agencies, for their part, enforce the law as it stands and are not the judges of whether it is just. Many judges have worked in legislative consultancy during their careers, and a few have an exceptional grasp of it, but even they will admit that law is often a tool through which the intent of those in power is implemented and protected.
If this scepticism is even partly right, it matters for our argument. An external ideal cannot discipline interpretation. What remains is internal discipline: precision in drafting, and reasoned, transparent choices in adjudication.
12. Closing the gap: working proposals
Internationally, many codes, manuals and practices have emerged that give drafters a common method, and a common method of drafting may lead to a common method of interpreting statutes. They also help courts construe statutes in light of the drafters’ shared understanding of what particular words and phrases are meant to do. Pakistan can borrow the idea without copying the models. The following proposals are offered as a starting point for debate, not as a finished programme.
- Draft with the grey area and the reader in mind. Where a provision foreseeably meets borderline cases, the drafter should narrow the term, state exceptions, or include a short statement of purpose, using the interpretive rules that courts are known to apply.
- Build specialised drafting capacity. Government bills should be drafted by a trained, permanent cadre of drafters, not by lawyers engaged case by case and vetted afterwards.
- Adopt one official drafting standard. Federal and provincial legislatures should adopt a published, uniform standard, rather than leaving the field to NGO models that bind no one.
- Share the toolkit. Drafters and courts should work from the same interpretive conventions, and when a court relies on text, purpose, intent or history, it should say why, and why the competing tools were rejected.
- Check the applicable General Clauses Act. Drafters and courts should state which Act applies, and why, before relying on its rules.
- Put what matters in the text. Statements of objects and reasons, explanatory notes and drafting instructions should be preserved and made accessible, so that courts can rely on them openly, while statements made in debate remain secondary to the enacted words.
13. Back to the park
Return to the park gate. The sign-maker could have written “No motor vehicles, except wheelchairs.” The park keeper, asked why he turned away a skateboarder, could have answered honestly: “I decided the sign covers it, and here is why.” Neither step requires a new theory of law. One requires a drafter who recognises the grey area in advance, and the other an interpreter who admits when he is standing in it.
Pakistan’s legal community does not lack interpretive tools. It lacks a link between those who write the sign and those who read it, and a habit of candor about what the reading involves. Building that link is the work that remains.



