As the Prime Minister flew to Quetta to announce a continuation of military operations, Pakistan’s opposition voices in Balochistan and the country’s most authoritative editorial platform have delivered a contrasting verdict: the approach is not working and will not work without a parallel political process (Dawn editorial, July 10; Dawn).
Dawn’s July 10 editorial — headlined “Balochistan carnage” — said that the July 5-8 attacks, which killed 42 security personnel and civilians in three coordinated incidents, reflect a sustained operational capability on the part of armed groups that targeted police posts, civilian areas and military convoys simultaneously. “A viable dialogue and political process involving Baloch nationalists and other stakeholders with roots in the province is essential to bring peace to Balochistan,” the editorial stated, adding that military operations alone have not produced a reduction in the frequency or sophistication of attacks.
Opposition voices within Balochistan have made similar arguments. Political figures representing constituencies where disappearances, extrajudicial operations, and resource exploitation are lived realities have renewed calls for the government to open formal talks with Baloch nationalist parties and civil society — including those whose political positions stop well short of endorsing the BLA’s armed campaign but who nonetheless articulate the grievances that sustain the insurgency’s recruiting base.
The structural critique
Pakistan’s military operations in Balochistan have successfully degraded individual cells, neutralised commanders, and disrupted supply chains. What they have not done is change the political economy that produces new fighters. Balochistan’s resource wealth — natural gas, copper, gold, coal — flows to the federal government while the province’s poverty rate remains the highest in Pakistan. Enforced disappearances, which human rights organisations have documented in the thousands, generate sustained family-level grievances that outlast any single military campaign. The lack of genuine provincial autonomy in practice, despite constitutional provisions, means that Balochistan’s elected officials have limited ability to deliver what their constituents most need.
Against this backdrop, a political dialogue with Baloch nationalist parties — which do have a constituency, unlike the BLA, which is a proscribed armed group — would serve a different function than peace talks with the insurgency itself. It would create a legitimate political outlet for grievances that currently have no formal channel, and give provincial leaders a reason to invest in the state’s legitimacy rather than to remain passive in the face of alienation.
Whether the current government has the political will for such a process — which would require concessions that powerful security sector interests would resist — remains the central question.
